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WHEN MAY A PROBATION CONDITION ALLOWING USE OF
MEDICAL MARIJUANA VIOLATE THE CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT? JUDICIAL RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND
PROMOTING PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE JUDICIARY
FREDERIC RODGERSt
INTRODUCTION
Judges in states that have legitimatized medical marijuana, such as
Colorado, are faced increasingly with the question of whether they must
order persons to whom they grant probation in criminal cases to refrain
from medical marijuana use. Under federal law it is "unlawful for any
person to knowingly or intentionally possess" marijuana.' Any person
who violates the prohibition may be sentenced to prison for "not more
than one year."2
Notwithstanding federal law, the Colorado Medical Use of Marijua-
na Amendment provides an exception from the state's criminal laws for
any patient in lawful possession of a "registry identification card," au-
thorizing the holder to use marijuana for medical purposes. While pos-
session of marijuana remains a criminal offense in Colorado, a patient's
medical use of marijuana within the limits set forth in the Amendment is
deemed "lawful."s
Against this legal backdrop, judges recognize that probation is a
privilege, not a right.6 Many convicted persons, including inter alia, im-
t Frederic Rodgers served as judge in Gilpin County, Colorado since appointment by Gov-
ernor Richard Lamm in 1986 until retirement in 2011. Before that he was a U.S. Army military
judge, juvenile court magistrate, a municipal court judge, and in private practice. He is a long-time
member of the editorial boards of the ABA Judges Journal and Judicature, served as Chair of the
ABA Judicial Division, on the ABA Board of Governors, as an at-large member of the ABA House
of Delegates and member of the Board of Directors of the American Judicature Society. Long active
at the National Judicial College in Reno, Nevada, he chaired its Faculty Council in 1999 and chaired
its Board of Trustees for 2009-2010.
1. 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (2006); see also § 802(6) (2006); § 812(b)(1), (c), sched. I (c)(10)
(2006) (defining marijuana as a Schedule I controlled substance).
2. See § 844(a). (defining possession of a controlled substance as a federal crime subject to
imprisonment of not more than one year); see also § 829(a),(b) (2006) (establishing conditions for
the lawful prescription of drugs); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 27-28 (2005) (holding that, under
federal statutes, marijuana has no acceptable medical uses).
3. COLO. CONST. art. XVHI, § 14(2)(b).
4. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-18-406(1) (2012).
5. COLO. CONsT. art. XVIII, § 14(4)(a).
6. See People v. Colabello, 948 P.2d 77, 79 (Colo. App. 1997). Gonzales v. Raich was de-
cided on commerce clause grounds, not preemption under the supremacy clause (Art. VI). 545 U.S.
at 22; see also People v. Mentch, 195 P.3d 1061, 1068 (Cal. 2008) (holding that an individual must
do more than simply supply a patient with medical marijuana to qualify as a "primary care-giver");
State v. Mullins, 116 P.3d 441, 446 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (same).
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paired drivers, gain this privilege, especially first offenders. When a de-
fendant is granted probation, the court suspends what might be a harsher
punishment, if consistent with the offender's potential for rehabilitation
and the safety of the community.' In effect, probation is a contract be-
tween the court and the convicted person, allowing him or her to avoid
jail by good conduct and following all the terms of probation. If the de-
fendant breaches those terms, the judge revokes probation and imposes
another sentence.' The same reasoning applies to juvenile offenders.9
The question then becomes, can a judge impose a probation condition
banning marijuana use when the defendant is a medical marijuana user.?
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The American Bar Association's Model Code of Judicial Conduct
(the Code) provides a template for each state to adopt as its own Code of
Judicial Conduct.i0 Colorado's 2011 Code of Judicial Conduct follows
the language of the ABA Code in all pertinent respects: Canon 1 requires
in Rule 1.1(A) that "[a] judge shall comply with the law, including the
Code of Judicial Conduct."" Rule 1.2 states that "[a] judge shall act at all
times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence,
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety
and the appearance of impropriety."' 2 Canon 2 in Rule 2.2 requires that
"[a] judge shall uphold and apply the law, and shall perform all duties of
judicial office fairly and impartially.' 3 The Code's definition of "'law'
encompasses court rules and orders as well as statutes, constitutional
provisions, and decisional law."' 4 Comment 2 in Canon 2 says,
"[a]lthough each judge comes to the bench with a unique background
and personal philosophy, a judge must interpret and apply the law with-
out regard to whether the judge approves or disapproves of the law in
question."'
7. Holdren v. People, 452 P.2d 28, 30 (Colo. 1969).
8. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 780, 791 (1973) (defendant's probation was re-
voked and his original sentence reinstated for "associat[ing] with known criminals" in violation of
his probation terms and being "involved in, and arrested for, a burglary;" the Supreme Court, on
habeas corpus petition later held that due process entitled defendant to hearing before revocation of
probation).
9. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 4-5, 7-9 (1967) (juvenile's probation revoked and juvenile
"committed ... as juvenile delinquent to State Industrial School" until age 21 or "discharge by due
process of law;" the Supreme Court, on habeas corpus petition, held that the revocation of probation
did not meet procedural due process requirements); in re B.L.M., 500 P.2d 146, 147-48 (Colo. App.
1972) (juvenile's probation revoked after state presented evidence that juvenile was involved in
criminal activity in violation of terms of his probation).
10. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT pmbl. (1990) (amended 2010).
I1. COLO. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 1, R. 1.1(A) (2011).
12. Id. R. 1.2.
13. Id. Canon 2, R. 2.2.
14. Id. at 4.
15. Id. at Canon 2 cmt. 2.
[Vol. 89:41018
2012] PROBATION AND MEDICAL MARIJUANA USE
MANDATORY CONDITIONS OF PROBATION
The American Bar Association Standards Relating to Sentencing
Alternatives and Procedures (1968), the ABA Standards Relating to Pro-
bation (1968), and the ABA Standards for Traffic Justice (1974) each
encourage the use of probation in preference to incarceration as long as
such a sentence does not unduly diminish the seriousness of the of-
fense. 16 Probation has been described as "a matter of grace."' 7 Trial
judges are alert to an offender's potential for rehabilitation, and many
face the reality of overcrowded jails when making decisions on whether
to grant probation." Drug and alcohol treatment providers are a large
part of the therapeutic landscape, and many successes are realized by
addicted persons who genuinely desire to recover.
In Colorado, as in all other states, "probation is a statutory creation
and the terms of probation must be derived from the applicable statute."' 9
Colorado law identifies mandatory and discretionary conditions for pro-
bation, and states:
[C]onditions of probation shall be such as the court in its discretion
deems reasonably necessary to ensure that the defendant will lead a
law-abiding life and to assist the defendant in doing so. The court
shall provide as [an] explicit condition[] of every sentence to proba-
tion that the defendant not commit another offense during the period
for which the sentence remains subject to revocation.20
In considering probation, the court necessarily considers community
protection, the seriousness of the offense, "and the offender, in that or-
der."21 Standard conditions of probation require no excessive consump-
22
tion of alcohol or controlled substances. Monitoring by toxicology test-
ing or AntabuseTM 23 may also be a requirement. Persons on probation
waive certain privacy rights enjoyed by other members of society, such
as the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, and they
16. ABA ADVISORY COMM. ON SENTENCING AND REVIEW, STANDARDS RELATING TO
SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES 63-64, 240 (1967) (Probation Standards § 1.3;
Sentencing Alternatives Standards §§ 2.3 and 5.3; Traffic Standards § 4.3).
17. Gehl v. People, 423 P.2d 332, 334 (Colo. 1967).
18. Many Colorado county sheriffs place numeric limits on non-violent prisoners the county
jail will hold, and may ask judges to release non-violent prisoners to meet the limits. The author has
been contacted by county sheriffs in four counties-Adams, Gilpin, Jefferson, and Summit-about
such limits and releases.
19. People v. Brockelman, 933 P.2d 1315, 1318 (Colo. 1997).
20. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-204(l) (2012).
21. Logan v. People ex rel. Alamosa Cnty., 332 P.2d 897, 899 (Colo. 1958); see Brockelman,
933 P.2d at 1318-19.
22. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-204(2)(a) (2012).
23. 14 ROBERT DIETER, COLO. PRAC., CRIMINAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 6.46 (2d ed.)
(2011).
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must accept the inevitable random visit by the probation officer as well
24as drug and alcohol screening.
State laws also require a person on probation not to violate any fed-
eral, state or local laws or orders of court.25 While the possession of ma-
rijuana remains unlawful under federal law,26 the highly publicized Oc-
tober 19, 2009 Department of Justice memo on marijuana enforcement
brings little clarity to the situation.2 7 Marijuana remains on the controlled
substances list and thus is ipso facto illegal, but the memorandum states
that the U.S. government will not prosecute compliant patients in states
permitting marijuana use by persons with debilitating medical condi-
tions28. Under this state of the law, an applicant for probation who partic-
ipates in a legal marijuana compassionate use program squarely presents
a sentencing judge with a real-life conundrum on how to apply seeming-
ly conflicting federal and state laws.2 9
EFFECT OF LOCAL RULES OF COURT ON SENTENCING A MEDICAL
MARIJUANA PATIENT TO PROBATION
Six of Colorado's twenty-two judicial districts are governed by
blanket chief judge orders forbidding the use of medical marijuana for
anyone on supervised probation, thus restricting trial judges' options.o
Two districts (i.e., the third and nineteenth) allow probationers to contin-
ue their prescribed use of medical marijuana.3' In the remaining districts,
judges have addressed the issue on a case-by-case basis, 32 until the recent
case of People v. Watkins. In that case, the Colorado Court of Appeals
vacated a trial court's order approving a defendant's use of marijuana for
24. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-204(2)(a)(X) (2012); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S.
112, 118-19 (2001).
25. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-1.3-204 (2012); People v. Colabello, 948 P.2d 77, 78, 80
(Colo. App. 1997).
26. Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801, 812, 844(a) (2006).
27. Memorandum from Deputy Attorney Gen. David W. Ogden to Selected United States
Attorneys 1-2 (Oct. 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/medical-
marijuana.pdf. Deputy Attorney General Ogden's memorandum announced that federal prosecutori-
al priorities should not target "individuals whose actions are in clear and unambiguous compliance
with existing state laws providing for the medical use of marijuana." Id. Nonetheless, it states that
the "prosecution of commercial enterprises that unlawfully market and sell marijuana for profit
continues to be an enforcement priority," and that it "does not 'legalize' marijuana or provide a legal
defense to a violation of federal law. Id.
28. Id.
29. Under principles of federalism as expressed in the U.S. Constitution, "states must be free
to develop a variety of solutions to problems and not be forced into a common, uniform mold."
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431 (1979). This freedom extends to the "great latitude" given
the states "under their police powers to legislate as to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, com-
fort, and quiet of all persons." Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 270 (2006) (quoting Medtronic,
Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996)).
30. Jeffrey Wolf, Deborah Sherman, & Nicole Vap, Colo. Judges Play Doctor with Medical




33. No. 10CA0579, 2012 WL 310776 (Colo. App. Feb. 2, 2012).
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medical purposes while on probation.34 The court of appeals concluded
that state criminal law" requires that probation sentences include a con-
dition that probationers not commit criminal offenses, including federal
offenses, notwithstanding the Colorado Medical Use of Marijuana
Amendment.36
Appellate courts, faced with the question of whether courts have au-
thority to impose a sentencing condition that denies a qualifying patient
the right to use medical marijuana in accordance with permitted state use,
have reached divergent results. 37 Some Colorado trial judges have ex-
pressed some discomfort with the strictures of the Watkins decision and
with local chief judge orders limiting their exercise of judicial discretion
to fashion the terms of probation to the unique needs of individual cas-
es.38 They point to cases in other jurisdictions which seem to reach a
result contrary to Watkins, such as People v. Tilehkooh,39 in which the
California Court of Appeal reversed a probation revocation for marijuana
possession for "failure to obey all laws" because state courts do not en-
force federal law.4 0 In City of Garden Grove v. Superior Court,4 1 that
same California court also held that federal law did not preempt state law
on the issue of medical marijuana and probation, so that the defendant
was entitled to have the marijuana evidence returned to him after crimi-
nal charges had been dismissed.42 Similarly, in People v. Bianco,43 the
same court held that trial judges must be free to "impose conditions of
probation that [may] impinge on a defendant's constitutional rights if
they are 'narrowly drawn' and 'reasonably related to a compelling state
interest in reformation and rehabilitation."'"
34. Id. at *7.
35. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-204(1) (2012).
36. Watkins, 2012 WL 310776, at *7. Attorney Sean McAllister sought review of the decision
in the Colorado Supreme Court, stating that "[tihe Court of Appeals is undermining Colorado law
and trying to enforce federal law on their own.. . . Judges don't have the expertise to decide what a
defendant needs for his health care needs. It should be up to the doctor." Felisa Cardona, Colorado
Court of Appeals Nixes Medical-Pot Use for Those on Probation, DENVER PosT, Feb. 8, 2012, at
4B. However, the Supreme Court denied certiorari, but Chief Justice Bender and Justice Mirquez
would have granted as to "[w]hether trial courts have the discretion to allow a seriously ill Colorado
probationer to use medical marijuana during a term of probation after the court considers the indi-
vidual circumstances of the case and the offense for which probation is imposed." Watkins v. Peo-
ple, No. 12SC179, 2012 WL 1940753 (Colo. May 29, 2012).
37. See, e.g., People v. Tilehkooh, 113 Cal. App. 4th 1433, 1438, 1447 (2003); City of Garden
Grove v. Superior Court, 157 Cal. App. 4th 355, 386 (2007); People v. Bianco, 93 Cal. App. 4th 748,
750-51 (2001).
38. Interviews with trial judges participating in ethics programs the author presented in 2009-
II.
39. 113 Cal. App. 4th 1433 (2003).
40. Id at 1438, 1447. Accord State v. Nelson, 195 P.3d 826, 833-834 (Mont. 2008) (using the
same analysis, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction requiring defendant to comply with all federal
laws).
41. 157 Cal. App. 4th 355 (2007).
42. Id. at 386, 391.
43. 93 Cal. App. 4th 748 (2001).
44. Id. at 754-55 (quoting People v. Hackler, 13 Cal. App. 4th 1049, 1058 (1993)).
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Although the Watkins court distinguished the cases permitting judg-
es to authorize medical marijuana patients to continue their use of mari-
juana while on probation, this decision raises questions regarding judicial
independence and the extent to which a judge must exercise judicial re-
straint under the Code of Judicial Conduct in applying the law, regardless
of personal philosophy. The Colorado Supreme Court has expressed its
discomfort with a statute that established a classification of marijuana
that was contrary to the "overwhelming weight of [scientific] authori-
ty."4s In that case, the court recognized its ethical responsibility to give
great deference to a legislative classification, even one with which it
strongly disagreed. Although the majority encouraged the legislature to
amend the questionable law and demonstrate that it "is in touch with
scientific reality," nonetheless it left reforming the law to the General
Assembly. 46 In the dissenting opinion, Justice Lee disagreed, quoting
Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison,47 who declared "it is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is,'- 8 concluding that "[a] [c]ourt is not at liberty to shut its
eyes to an obvious mistake, when the validity of the law depends upon
the truth of what is declared." 4 9 Later, when the Colorado Supreme Court
confronted the same issue in People v. Bennett,50 it again deferred to the
legislature, "[a]t least for the time being."5' After the issue arose for the
third time in People v. Steed,52 the Court referred to Canon 2 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct53 saying, "[p]erhaps a dissent may be written in a
succeeding case or two, but in our minds the Code of Judicial Conduct
should bury the idea of a judge dissenting on the same issue Ad infini-
tum." 54 The court's comment in Steed may be explained by the legisla-
ture at last having followed the court's recommendations and amended
the law, although not in time to benefit the Steed appellant.
Several cases from other jurisdictions are helpful in understanding
the tension between judicial reactions to statutes restricting judges' dis-
cretion and prevailing notions. of judicial independence. A New Mexico
judge objected to his chief judge's order transferring juvenile cases out
of his court and dispersing them among the other judges' divisions of the
court.5 Enraged, Judge Castellano purported to countermand the chief
45. People v. Summit, 517 P.2d 850, 852 (Colo. 1974).
46. Id. at 851-54.
47. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
48. Id. at 177.
49. Summit, 517 P.2d at 855 (Lee, J., dissenting) (quoting Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264
U.S. 543, 547 (1924)).
50. 536 P.2d 42 (Colo. 1975).
51. Id. at 430.
52. 540 P.2d 323 (Colo. 1975).
53. COLO. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 1, R. 1.1 (2010) (stating that "[a] judge
should comply with the law").
54. Steed, 540 P.2d at 326 n.3.
55. In re Castellano, 889 P.2d 175, 180-81 (N.M.1975).
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judge order and held the court administrator in contempt for refusal to
follow his directions, sentencing her to jail. The state supreme court
stepped in, prohibiting his actions, and ultimately removed him from
office for, inter alia, failure to follow the law, in violation of Canons 1
and 2 of the Code. Similarly, an Indiana trial judge was reprimanded
for failing to obey an appellate court mandate to vacate an improper sen-
tence, which caused a prisoner to spend an extra year in prison.57 An
Ohio judge was suspended for false and incendiary statements made dur-
ing a television interview that were critical of the appellate court that had
just reversed one of his decisions.58 A Wisconsin trial judge who refused
to follow his chief judge's order setting trial court hours and threatened
to "go public" with untruthful stories about the chief judge was suspend-
ed for failure to follow the law and attempted extortion.59
In jurisdictions with laws permitting use of marijuana by persons
diagnosed with debilitating medical conditions and without superseding
appellate opinions or other requirements restricting the probation option,
the sentencing judge considering probation must carefully review the
offender's pharmaceutical regimen. If the offender is demonstrably inca-
pable of controlling his or her behavior when under the influence of any
drugs-legal or illegal-probation would be an ill-considered sentence.
However, an offender who is prescribed any drug (including medical
marijuana) that has the potential to impair ability to drive, but who at the
same time is willing to abide by the law and not drive a car while taking
that drug, might be a good candidate for probation, if not otherwise indi-
cated by the facts.
Clearly, courts may order a probationer to abstain from alcohol and
controlled substances as a condition of probation.6 0 Equally certain is that
courts may prohibit the use of illegal drugs.6 1 Judges know that a proba-
tioner who professes to work toward rehabilitation may lead a law-
abiding life and be a safer driver if on a program of monitored abstention
from either legal or illegal intoxicants. 62 Judges recognize that communi-
ty safety and protection are furthered when an alcoholic in recovery is on
a monitored sobriety program. With alcohol prohibited, this probationer
is more likely to work through the recovery program successfully;63 from
this a judge may infer that a successful recovery program will reduce the
56. See id at 182-85.
57. In re Newman, 858 N.E.2d 632, 633-36 (Ind. 2006).
58. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Ferreri, 710 N.E.2d 1107, 1108, 1111 (Ohio 1999).
59. In re Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against Crawford, 629 N.W.2d 1, 3, 11 (Wis.
2001); see also In re Lokuta, II A.3d 427, 43-32, 449-50 (Pa. 2011); Cal. Comm'n on Judicial
Performance, Public Admonishment of Judge Anthony C. Edwards 2 (Feb. 7, 2012),
http://cjp.ca.gov/res/docs/publicadmon/Edwards 2-7-12.pdf (ruling that judge abused his authority
and violated his duties to "respect and comply with the law" and to "be faithful to the law").
60. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-204(2)(a)(VIll) (2012).
61. Id. §§ 18-1.3-204(1), (2)(a)(VIll)).
62. Id. §§ 18-1.3-204(2)(a)(VIll) (XIV.5), 42-4-1307(7)(b)(VI) (2012).
63. See id. § 18-1.3-204(1).
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likelihood of the offender returning to drinking or drugging and driving.
However, a prohibition of prescribed medication use is rarely a provision
of probation.64
Should the same rationale governing alcohol use also apply to med-
ical use of marijuana? If the offender demonstrates a propensity to drive
a vehicle while impaired by prescribed medications of any kind, a judge
may deem the defendant a danger to society and decline to grant proba-
tion. Whether the drug of choice is alcohol, VicodinTM, NyQuilTM or ma-
65rijuana, a judge may regulate its use as a requirement of probation.
However, the difference under the law between these substances turns on
whether the use is recreational or medically therapeutic. Few have the
temerity to argue with a straight face that alcohol use is therapeutic.
True, it may relax, relieve tension, and provide a pleasurable high to the
drinker, but its medical use is limited to local sterilization. Medication,
whether available over the counter or by prescription only, is arguably
different. A speaker at the Marijuana at the Crossroads Symposium at the
University of Denver Sturm College of Law opined that differentiating
marijuana from the other drugs because of its recent history as a recrea-
tional drug does not settle the question. 66
JUDGES' CHOICES
Judges need to examine their own state's law on medical marijuana,
in particular whether it provides immunity or an affirmative defense to a
marijuana patient or provider. It is reasonable to question the wisdom of
64. While possession of marijuana remains a criminal offense in Colorado, id. § 18-18-
406(1), a patient's medical use of marijuana within the limits set forth in the Amendment is deemed
"lawful" under subsection (4)(a) of the Amendment. COLO. CONST. art. XVil, § 14(4)(a). Under the
Amendment, however, a physician does not prescribe marijuana, but may only provide "written
documentation" stating that the patient has a debilitating medical condition and might benefit from
the medical use of marijuana. COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 14(2)(c)(ll); Beinor v. Indus. Claim Ap-
peals Office, 262 P.3d 970, 973 (Colo. App. 2011) (stating that "a physician's inability to prescribe
marijuana under Colorado law is reflected in the very physician certification" which specifies that
'[t]his assessment is not a prescription for the use of marijuana"'). Therefore, a defendant's physi-
cian's certification does not constitute a "written lawful prescription" as required by the terms of his
probation.
The Colorado Supreme Court denied certiorari in Beinor but Chief Justice Bender and
Justice Marquez would have granted as to the following issues:
Whether the medical marijuana provisions of the Colorado Constitution, article XVIII,
section 14, confer a right to use medical marijuana or merely protection from criminal
prosecution.
Whether petitioner was erroneously disqualified from receiving state unemployment
compensation benefits under 8-73-108(5)(e)(IX.5),for violating his employer's zero-
tolerance drug policy by having marijuana in his blood, notwithstanding his authorization
to use medical marijuana.
Beinor v. Industrial Claim Appeal Office, No. I 1SC676, 2012 WL 1940833 (Colo. May 29, 2012).
65. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-204(2)(a)(VIII), (XV) (2012).
66. Jill Lamoureux-Leigh, a representative of Colorado marijuana dispensary owners and
active with Colorado state regulatory activities. See Chase Squires, Grass Confusion: DU Law Panel
Tackles Tangled Maryuana Laws, DENVER POST, Feb. 9, 2012, at 14C,
http://yourhub.denverpost.com/denver/grass-confusion-du-panels-tackle-tangled-marijuana-
laws/VmSaSuasj l UEnxHoawxO8J-ugc.
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converting a recreational drug to a medical drug by popular vote.67 Many
judges fear that state initiatives approving medical marijuana are simply
a back-door approach to legalizing all drugs.68 Some are chiefly con-
cerned that marijuana use violates the law regardless of whether the fed-
eral government intends to enforce it against medical users and, thus, is
incongruous with the requirement that a probationer be law-abiding.69 In
their view, the Code of Judicial Conduct renders unethical a sentencing
judge's decision to overlook the illegality of marijuana use under federal
law, despite its state-sanctioned medical use.
Each case before a judge must be carefully examined on its own
merits and the applicable law. A judge's comfort level may be elevated
by evidence at sentencing about the defendant's medical condition and
the effects of prescribed marijuana upon it. If any applicant for probation
appears to be using any prescribed medication in bad faith, such use may
serve as a factor in the judge's weighting of the community safety and
protection sentencing goals in deciding the probation issue. Judges may
determine that a defendant's marijuana use for medical purposes is in
bad faith if there exists no debilitating medical condition to support the
patient's placement on the state registry of qualified medical marijuana
users. Other factors which may influence a judge to determine bad faith
medical marijuana use are: (1) the marijuana use is reasonably related to
the crime for which the defendant was convicted; (2) a demonstrated
likelihood that the defendant will possess marijuana for non-medical
purposes, or in greater quantities than permitted for medical purposes
under law; (3) a demonstrated tendency on the defendant's part to be-
come addicted to drugs; or (4) a demonstrated likelihood that medical
marijuana use will undermine a court ordered substance abuse treatment
72program.
Whether marijuana prohibition eventually goes the way of the
Eighteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the Volstead Act is
unknowable. 73 It is important not to sentence by rote, formula, and man-
67. As Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Alex Kozinski stated in his concurrence in
Conant v. Walters, while the allowance of medical marijuana "may seem faddish or foolish . . . the
public record reflect[s] a legitimate and growing division of informed opinion on this issue." 309
F.3d 629, 640 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J. concurring). "A surprising number of health care profes-
sionals and organizations have concluded that the use of marijuana may be appropriate for a small
class of patients who do not respond well to, or do not tolerate, available prescription drugs." Id. at
640-41.




71. See CoLO. REV.STAT. § 18-18-406.3(2)(a) (2012).
72. People v. Lent, 541 P.2d 545, 548 (Cal.1975).
73. Alcohol prohibition under the Eighteenth Amendment in 1919, U.S. CONsT. amend.
XVIII, was repealed fourteen years later by the Twenty-first Amendment in 1933. U.S. CONST.
amend. XXI.
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datory guidelines. 74 in states where the law provides complete immunity
to a qualifying medical marijuana user, appellate courts have resolved
the issue without regard to questions of judicial ethics.7 5 Resolving in-
consistencies and harmonizing conflicting views have always been a part
of the judicial job description.76 The current anomalous state of the law
on medical marijuana is one of the challenges judges must face, but it is
not insurmountable.
74. In United States v. Booker, the Court held that the federal sentencing guidelines, previous-
ly mandatory, should be treated as merely advisory to cure a constitutional deficiency in the system.
543 U.S. 220, 259 (2005) (Breyer, J.).
75. See Tilehkooh, 113 Cal. App. 4th at 1438, 1447; City of Garden Grove, 157 Cal. App. 4th
at 386; Bianco, 93 Cal. App. 4th at 750-51 n.41; see also Nelson, 195 P.3d at 833-34.
76. The Colorado rules of statutory construction offer little guidance. See COLO. REV. STAT. §
2-4-201-216 (2012). In particular, the preference favoring local over general applicability of con-
flicting statutes in § 2-4-205 applies to conflicts in state law, rather than conflicts between federal
and state law.
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